Iran's enriched uranium, IAEA report by report

Drag across the chart or the slider to pick a report. Each dot is one IAEA quarterly figure; the areas join them with straight lines, and nothing is known between reports.

How to read it

The colored areas are Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium as each IAEA report to the Board of Governors gave it, stacked by enrichment level and measured in kilograms of uranium. Up to 5 percent is fuel for power reactors; 20 percent is research-reactor fuel and counts as highly enriched uranium; 60 percent is a short technical step from the roughly 90 percent used in weapons. The dashed line is the total in every chemical form, including oxide, fuel and scrap.

Before 2021 the IAEA split the whole stockpile by level. From 2021 it split only the UF6 gas, so the gap between the areas and the dashed line is uranium in other forms. Pick 20% and 60% or 60% only to see the highly enriched stock, which is small next to the total.

The panel labels each report. Until February 2021 the IAEA verified the figures. After Iran stopped extra monitoring that month, the IAEA estimated the stockpile, partly from Iran's own declarations. Since the attacks began on 13 June 2025 it has had no access to the affected sites, and its 2026 reports say it "cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts" of the stockpile. The shaded band covers that period.

Where things stand, 6 October 2026

The IAEA's last estimate, as of 13 June 2025, is 9,874.9 kg of enriched uranium, including 440.9 kg enriched up to 60 percent (GOV/2025/50). Its September 2026 report (GOV/2026/50) says it has no information about, or access to, any of Iran's four declared enrichment facilities, and cannot report the stockpile's size, composition or whereabouts. Director General Grossi told the Board on 7 September that it is "more than a year since the Agency lost continuity of knowledge" of the LEU and HEU. On 9 September the Board reported Iran to the UN Security Council. In late September Iran's president said Tehran could give up its 60 percent uranium under the NPT; no agreement had been announced.

Method

IAEA reports used

Event sources

Breakout and yardstick sources