Magazine on
Day 0
Interceptors left, by system
Leakers per day
What moves the result most
- Better for Taiwan
- Worse for Taiwan
Magazine on
Day 0
Interceptors left, by system
Leakers per day
What moves the result most
Air and missile defense runs on a stock of interceptors. Every missile Taiwan shoots down costs one or more of them, and each system has a finite number. This tool sets a daily PRC salvo against that stock and counts down, day by day, until each type of interceptor is gone.
Pick a salvo in the panel, or set the numbers yourself. The bars at the top show what is left of each system on the chosen day. The first chart shows the whole magazine shrinking; the vertical line marks the dry day, when the last interceptor able to hit a ballistic missile is fired. The second chart shows how many threats arrive each day and how many get through. Drag across either chart, or press Play.
The last chart answers "what matters most?" It moves one input at a time, 25 percent down and up, and ranks the inputs by how far they move the dry day, or the number of leakers in the first 30 days. Inputs at the top deserve the most scrutiny.
Each day the salvo arrives: ballistic missiles first, then cruise missiles, then drones. A share of drones is stopped by guns, jamming and fighters before any missile fires. Each remaining threat draws interceptors from the systems allowed to engage it, in a fixed, notional order: for ballistic missiles the most capable interceptors first; for cruise missiles and drones, cheaper rounds first. The firing doctrine sets how many interceptors each threat costs and the chance of a kill. Shoot fires one. Shoot-shoot fires two at once. Shoot-look-shoot fires a second only after a miss, and only when there is time to see the result. When a system is empty the next one takes over; when all are empty, everything gets through. Production and deliveries arrive at the end of each day.
All results are expected values, so a day can show fractions of a missile. Patriot PAC-2 and Tien Kung III get a lower kill chance against ballistic missiles (60 percent of the value you set), and Tien Kung II and NASAMS do not engage them at all, following the open-source descriptions of their roles.
What is sourced: PRC ballistic and cruise missile inventories (DoD 2024), the interceptor estimates and order figures in the table, Tien Kung III production capacity, and the sizes of the Iranian and Russian salvos used as analogs. What is notional: kill chances, firing doctrine, the share of stock able to fire, the drone rate, the share of drones stopped without missiles, the opening surge, wartime production and U.S. deliveries, the firing order, and the choice to repeat a one-night salvo every day. None of these has a public figure for Taiwan.
What the model leaves out: launcher and radar losses, the number of launchers that can fire at once, reload time, coverage gaps (for example east of the Central Mountains), targets the PLA chooses, decoys, rocket artillery such as the PCH-191, air-launched missiles, the PLA's 1,300 medium-range ballistic missiles, U.S. and allied defenses, fighters with air-to-air missiles, Stinger and other short-range systems, and interceptors already spent in live-fire drills. It gives national totals only and says nothing about where any unit is based.
| System | Default | Basis | Source |
|---|
Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense does not publish interceptor stocks. Notification figures are ceilings, not deliveries. The default assumes the 102-missile PAC-3 MSE order has arrived; The Liberty Times, citing military and government sources, reported only that a first batch was delivered in early January 2026.